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WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HA VE SAID EDITED BY JACK
M. BALKIN (NEW YORK: NYU PRESS, 2005) 302 pages.'
BY ERIN NELSON 2
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade has
been both celebrated and vilified for the past thirty-three years. It is
nothing if not controversial, and this is not surprising. Abortion is
perhaps the most hotly debated social issue in the United States today,
and Roe, the case that granted American women a constitutional right
to terminate a pregnancy, is a key target for abortion opponents. But the
approach to constitutional interpretation in Roe is so controversial that
even those who agree that women should be legally entitled to terminate
unwanted pregnancies disagree with it.4
Anyone who doubts the currency of a discussion of Roe need
only look to South Dakota, whose governor recently signed a statute
banning all abortions save those necessary to preserve the life of the
pregnant woman. Even in life-saving abortion procedures, physicians are
instructed to "make reasonable medical efforts ... to preserve both the
life of the mother and the life of her unborn child in a manner
consistent with conventional medical practice."5 Several other states
have introduced similar legislation.6 The governor of South Dakota has
acknowledged that the statute is a direct challenge to Roe, and that it is
'[WhatRoe v. Wade ShouldHave Said].
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Research Associate, Health Law Institute,
University of Alberta.
3410 U.S. 113; 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) [Roe], and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) [Doe].
4 In particular, the majority has been criticized for reading the Fourteenth Amendment too
broadly, so as to include "substantive due process," thereby opening the door to judicial review in
areas where it is inappropriate. In addition, it has been argued that the "right to privacy" has no
constitutional foundation. See e.g. John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade" (1973) 82 Yale L.J. 920; and Akhil Reed Amar, "Intratextualism" (1999) 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 747.
' Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D.
2006).
6 Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Guttmacher Institute Media Center, "1,207 State
Reproductive Health Bills Introduced by Mid-2006," online: <http://www.guttmacher.org/media>.
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intended to test whether a differently composed, more conservative
Supreme Court is prepared to reverse Roe.7
What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said starts with an intriguing
project: ask' a number of renowned constitutional scholars to write
opinions on Roe based only on materials available when the case was
being decided. The volume includes an introduction written by editor
Jack Balkin, the contributors' opinions, and post-opinion comments
from the contributors explaining why they chose to follow particular
lines of reasoning in their opinions. The list of "judges" is impressive,
including a number of the most eminent constitutional thinkers in the
United States today. As someone who is very interested in reproductive
rights-and in the impact and continuing importance of Roe--I
assumed I would find this book both engaging and enlightening.
Unfortunately, in my view, the unusual configuration of the book
prevents it from delivering on that promise.
Balkin offers three purposes for the book: to provide a vehicle
through which to "reexamine the premises of Roe and fundamental
rights jurisprudence at the beginning of a new century";8 to offer a
means to experiment with the theories of constitutional interpretation
espoused by many of the contributors in the aftermath of Roe, and
finally, to provide a forum for addressing questions about the role of the
judiciary that have arisen since the Roe decision. Balkin notes that both
opponents and supporters of the abortion right have disparaged the
decision, and that several aspects of the decision have contributed to
these critiques. Among other things, Justice Blackmun neglected to
provide an adequate defence of the abortion right he crafted; he
proposed an unwieldy trimester-based system that arose from
compromises among the justices themselves; and the Court failed utterly
to recognize that the abortion right is anchored in women's equality as
well as in liberty.9 Some were concerned about the sheer complexity of
the decision from the start; apparently Justice Blackmun gave some
'John Holusha, "South Dakota Governor Signs Abortion Ban" The New York Times (6
March 2006), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/06/politics/06cnd-abort.html?ei=5090&
en = 6bfaelad7041dcl a&ex= 1299301200&adxnnl= l&partner= rssuserland&emc =rss&adxnnlx= 11
63019712-MXJtZV33dz8H+pct9zR8/A>.
' Jack M. Balkin, "Preface" in Balkin, supra note 1, ix at xii ["Preface"].
' Jack M. Balkin, "Roe v. Wade. An Engine of Controversy" in Balkin, supra note 1, 3 at
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thought to writing an addendum to explain what he meant in his
judgment.1"
In addition to suffering under the constraint of judicial writing,
the appeal and utility of this book are further weakened by the
implausible notion that these authors have written their judgments as
though they were doing so in 1973. Balkin (editor and "chief justice")
instructed the contributors that while they were permitted to predict
future events, they could not refer to such events as fact, nor could they
cite material published after 22 January 1973 (the date the judgment in
Roe was handed down). But as Mark Tushnet points out in his
comments at the end of the volume,
[o]f course, we are academics, not judges, and we have lived through thirty years of
social, cultural, political and legal (if there are differences among these) experience since
then. I have no idea, and I think my colleagues have no idea, what constraints we would
face were we to be in a position to write real opinions in a real abortion case."
The eleven opinions themselves are well written and thoughtful,
and are probably among the best-reasoned "opinions" in American
constitutional law. But I would much prefer to read the academic
writing of any of these scholars than their make-believe judgments in a
thirty-year-old case. While their opinions remain true (for the most
part) to their other work in relation to the abortion right and
constitutional law, they are constrained by the format. 2 And, while
judicial opinions in real cases can certainly be lengthy, this set of
opinions stretches to 187 pages, well in excess of the judgments in Roe.13
Seven contributors found in favour of the abortion right, to
varying degrees and for various reasons. One dissented in part in Roe
and in whole in Doe, and three others dissented entirely from the
majority's opinion. The majority opinions tend to take the view that the
o Ibid. at 23, citing David J. Garrow, Liberty & Sexuality. The Right to Privacy and the
Making of Roe v. Wade (New York: MacMillan, 1994) at 587.
"Mark Tushnet in "Comments from the Contributors" in Balkin, supra note 1, 230 at 254
["Comments"].
"Indeed, in the "Preface," supra note 1, ix at xiii, Balkin himself notes that
tt]he task of putting one's views in the form of a judicial opinion requires an intellectual discipline that has its own
distinctive values. It is one thing to offer academic theories of constitutional interpretation. It is quite another to have
to articulate those theories in the form of a legal opinion and to demonstrate that one's views about the Constitution
really are consistent with a successful and acceptable judicial performance.
" Also in excess of Doe, supra note 3.
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constitutional right to abortion is grounded both in women's liberty and
equality, although each set of reasons approaches this conclusion from a
slightly different viewpoint. Balkin takes this dual-ground approach to
the abortion right, noting that prohibitions on abortion lead to
compulsory motherhood, which violates women's equality and liberty
interests. Balkin holds that the abortion right includes, where the
woman's life or health is not at risk, a reasonable amount of time to
determine whether or not to continue with the pregnancy; what amounts
to "reasonable time" is left to the legislatures to decide. Where the
woman's life or health is at risk, abortion is permissible throughout
pregnancy.
Reva Siegel bases her reasons on the equality arguments made
in amicus briefs in Roe and Doe, concluding that the principle of equal
citizenship, enshrined in the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments,
prohibits state action that is premised on traditional assumptions about
women. Anita Allen argues that the abortion right is based on women's
"procreative autonomy,"14 and rejects Balkin's "reasonable time to
decide" approach. Instead, Allen holds that "the fundamental nature of
the right to terminate pregnancy must mean that access to medically
safe abortion cannot be cut off absolutely after a legislated 'reasonable
time."'15 For Allen, this right "goes to the very core of what it means to
be a free person."16 Robin West also joins the chorus of those who claim
that restrictions on abortion violate women's liberty and equality. In
West's view, they do so by imposing supererogatory duties on women
when the law does not require any one else to act as a "good samaritan"
for the benefit of others. West also focuses on the fact that abortion laws
that do not make exceptions for pregnancies resulting from coerced
sexual activity or marital rape are particularly problematic. West
concludes that the real problem is one that the Supreme Court cannot
resolve: that motherhood, as the role is socially constructed, is
incompatible with equal citizenship. Accordingly, she ends her reasons
with a call to action directed at the U.S. Congress.
4 According to Allen, this autonomy is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment. Anita Allen,
"Allen, J., concurring in the judgement" in Balkin, supra note 1, 92 at 92.
'-'Ibid. at 93.
16 Ibid. at 101.
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Jed Rubenfeld bases his reasons on the right to privacy, which
he articulates as "'the right to a private life-a life of one's own ...."7
This right precludes the state from imposing "a specific, long-term, life-
altering and life-occupying course of conduct [one] does not choose for
[oneself]."1 8 Prohibiting abortion, or even severely restricting its
availability, forces women into just such an occupation-motherhood.
In his opinion, Cass Sunstein takes his theory of judicial
minimalism 9 for a test drive, holding that the impugned statutes in both
Roe and Doe should be struck down because they are overbroad.
Sunstein leaves to future cases the "harder questions,"2 ° including- the
precise contours of the abortion right and the balance that must be
struck between the state's interest in fetal life and women's freedom to
decide for themselves whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term.
Akhil Reed Amar would strike down the Texas law at issue in Roe
because that law was enacted at a time when women could not vote. It
therefore failed to "reflect women's equal input" and imposes unique
burdens on women that limit their ability to participate fully in political
life.21 By contrast, the Georgia law before the court in Doe had been
more recently enacted, and had not yet been considered by state courts.
Given the criticisms of Roe and the enthusiasm of the other
contributors for re-writing the decision, Tushnet's judgment comes as a
surprise. In his view, the concurring reasons of Justice Douglas in Doe
represent the best effort that any sitting member of the Supreme Court
in 1973 had to offer, and so he presents a "lightly edited"22 version of
that opinion as his own.
As for the dissenting opinions, one-Jeffrey Rosen's-is
procedural in nature. Rosen claims that because there is no foundation
"
7 Jed Rubenfeld, "Rubenfeld, J., concurring in the judgement except as to Doe" in Balkin,
supra note 1,109 at 119.
'
8 Ibid.
19 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time. Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
20 Cass R. Sunstein, "Sunstein, J., concurring in the judgement" in Balkin, supra note 1,148
at 148.
21 Ibid. at 166.
22
"Comments," in Balkin, supra note 1,230 at 250.
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for a right to privacy within the constitution, the' decision should not
have been made by the court but by state legislatures.23
The other two dissenters object to the majority's approach on
moral grounds. Teresa Stanton Collett claims that access to abortion is
what threatens women's liberty and equality. Collett writes that
"artificial birth control and abortion ... treat women's bodies as
unnatural, something to be altered to conform to the male model,"24 and
argues that liberal access to abortion permits men to avoid sexual and
parental responsibility, leaving women worse off. Collett concludes by
stating "I refuse to accept that women must deny their fertility and slay
their children in order to obtain equal access to the marketplace and the
public square."'
The final dissenter, Michael Stokes Paulsen, also draws heavily
on political rhetoric. Paulsen's judgment is unabashedly anti-abortion
and manages almost entirely to remove women from'the debate. He
appends to his opinion a series of photographs of a developing fetus,
making it very clear where his focus lies. Paulsen makes a constitutional
argument as well, arguing that "[t]he Constitution quite obviously does
not contain a right.to abortion."26
Most chilling about Paulsen's judgment is his assertion that
"[r]esistance to the Court's decision is not only legally justified. It is a
moral imperative."27 In his view, the majority's judgment "does ...
violence to the Constitution, and ... authorizes violence against innocent
'Jeffrey Rosen, "Rosen, J., dissenting" in Balkin, supra note 1, 170 at 170-86.
24 Teresa Stanton Collett, "Collett, J., dissenting" in Balkin, supra note 1, 187 at 189.
25 Ibid. at 194.
6 Michael Stokes Paulsen, "Paulsen, J., dissenting" in Balkin, supra note 1, 196 at 196-97.
21 Ibid. at 197. While Paulsen is not specific about what he means by "resistance," it is
possible that some would take it as an invitation to commit violence. He has been, perhaps, more
specific elsewhere. Paulsen has written that he is responsible
indirectly, remotely, only contributorily, and perhaps excusably, but nonetheless partially responsible-for the
deaths of one and a half million innocent unborn children per year. I might have been able to stop the nomination of
David Souter to the United States Supreme Court, and thus possibly could have prevented the Court's disastrous
reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade two years later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, if only I had been willing to violate my
duty of confidentiality as a government lawyer and leak to pro-life groups my advance knowledge of Souter's likely
nomination to the Supreme Court by President Bush in 1990. 1 had the information. I had the opportunity. I had the
time. I had the telephone in hand. But indecision, inertia, uncertainty-and probably cowardice-prevailed. I did
nothing.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, "Hell, Handbaskets, and Government Lawyers: The Duty of Loyalty and
its Limits" (1998) 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83 at 83.
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human life."28 To Paulsen, anyonewho fails to condemn the decision is
complicit in the evil perpetrated by it. Paulsen goes on to render his
"honest judgment" about both the decision and its authors, calling each
of the members of the majority a man or woman of violence; for the
partial dissenter, he reserves the designation "coward and
collaborator., 29 This language is startling for its departure from the
reasoned and collegial tone adopted by the other contributors, and is
disturbing in that it sounds much like a call to arms for abortion foes.
Ultimately, this is a book for students of American constitutional
law-in particular, for those who are interested to see how well the
authors' theories of constitutional interpretation and the judicial office
stand up to the test of being structured as judicial opinion. It will also
hold the attention of those interested in the legal history of the abortion
movement and the right to privacy in U.S. jurisprudence. It is not a
book, unfortunately, that will be of great interest to those more
concerned about the reproductive needs and interests of women, and
how law can help or hinder the evolution of good public policy in that
context. Neither is it a book that advances the reproductive rights
debate or helps us to imagine how we might best approach the new state
laws that have been enacted with a view to testing the Court's ongoing
commitment to its decision in Roe.
At the end of the day, I am left asking the same question posed
by Tushnet in his post-opinion comments: "So-and this is a serious
question-what's the point of the exercise?"3
2 Paulsen, "Paulsen J., dissenting" in Balkin, supra note 1, 186 at 213.
29 Ibid.
3
o"Comments," in Balkin, supra note 1,230 at 254.
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